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Abstract
Hamiache’s recent axiomatization of the well-known Shapley value for TU games states
that the Shapley value is the unique solution verifying the following three axioms: the
inessential game property, continuity and associated consistency. Driessen extended Hami-
ache’s axiomatization to the enlarged class of efficient, symmetric, and linear values, of
which the Shapley value is the most important representative.
In this paper, we introduce the notion of row (resp. column)-coalitional matrix in
the framework of cooperative game theory. Particularly, both the Shapley value and
the associated game are represented algebraically by their coalitional matrices called
the Shapley standard matrix MSh and the associated transformation matrix Mλ, re-
spectively. We develop a matrix approach for Hamiache’s axiomatization of the Shapley
value. The associated consistency for the Shapley value is formulated as the matrix equal-
ity MSh =MSh ·Mλ. The diagonalization procedure of Mλ and the inessential property
for coalitional matrices are fundamental tools to prove the convergence of the sequence
of repeated associated games as well as its limit game to be inessential. In addition, a
similar matrix approach is applicable to study Driessen’s axiomatization of a certain class
of linear values. Matrix analysis is adopted throughout both the mathematical develop-
ments and the proofs. In summary, it is illustrated that matrix analysis is a new and
powerful technique for research in the field of cooperative game theory.
Key Words: coalitional matrix, Shapley value, Shapley standard matrix, associated
transformation matrix, associated consistency.
2000 Mathematics Subject Classifications: Primary 91A12, Secondary 15A18
1 Introduction
A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU) is a pair 〈N, v〉, where N is a nonempty,
finite set and v : 2N → R is a characteristic function, defined on the power set of N , satisfying
∗The research for this paper was done during a four weeks stay (October 2, 2004 till October 29, 2004) of
the first author at the EEMCS, University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands.
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v(∅) = 0. An element of N (notation: i ∈ N) and a subset S of N (notation: S ⊆ N or
S ∈ 2N with S 6= ∅) are called a player and coalition respectively, and the associated real
number v(S) is called the worth of coalition S. The size of coalition S is denoted by s.
Particularly, n denotes the size of the player set N . We denote by G the universal game space
consisting of all these TU-games. In this paper, a TU-game 〈N, v〉 is always denoted by its
column vector of worths of all coalitions S ⊆ N in the traditional order (one-person coalitions
are at the top, etc.), i.e. ~v = (v(S))S⊆N,S 6=∅. If no confusion arises, we write v instead of ~v.
We only consider games with at least two players. A game 〈N, v〉 is said to be inessential if
for all coalitions S ⊆ N , v(S) =∑i∈S v({i}).
The solution part of cooperative game theory deals with the allocation problem of how to
divide the overall earnings the amount of v(N) among the players in the TU-game. There
is associated a single allocation called the value of the TU-game. Formally, a value on G
is a function Φ that assigns a single payoff vector Φ(N, v) = (Φi(N, v))i∈N ∈ Rn to every
TU-game 〈N, v〉 ∈ G. The so-called value Φi(N, v) of player i in the game 〈N, v〉 represents
an assessment by i of his gains for participating in the game.
Among all the values for TU-games, the Shapley value is the best known ([1, 6, 8]).
The Shapley value is also a striking example of the power of the axiomatic approach. The
eldest axiomatization of the Shapley value is stated by Shapley himself ([8]) by referring to
four properties called efficiency, symmetry, linearity, and dummy player property. In the
framework of values for TU-games, firstly let us review several essential properties treated in
former axiomatizations of the Shapley value. A value Φ on the universal game space G is said
to be efficient, if
∑
i∈N Φi(N, v) = v(N) for all games 〈N, v〉; symmetric, if Φpi(i)(N, piv) =
Φi(N, v) for all games 〈N, v〉, all i ∈ N , and every permutation pi on N ; linear, if Φ(N,α · v+
β · w) = α · Φ(N, v) + β · Φ(N,w) for all games 〈N, v〉, 〈N,w〉, and all α, β ∈ R; inessential,
if Φi(N, v) = v({i}) for all inessential games 〈N, v〉, all i ∈ N ; continuous, if for every
(pointwise) convergent sequence of games {〈N, vk〉}∞k=0, say the limit of which is the game
〈N, v¯〉, the corresponding sequence of values {Φ(N, vk)}∞k=0 converges to the value Φ(N, v¯).
Hamiache’s recent axiomatization of the Shapley value states that the Shapley value is the
unique one-point solution verifying the inessential game property, continuity and associated
consistency (see [3]). In his paper, an associated game 〈N, vShλ 〉 is constructed. And a sequence
of games is also defined, where the term of order m, in this sequence, is the associated game
of the term of order m − 1. He showed that this sequence of games converges and that the
limit game is inessential. The value is obtained using the inessential game property, the
associated consistency and the continuity axioms. As a by-product, neither the linearity nor
the efficiency axioms are needed. In [2], Driessen extended Hamiache’s axiomatization to the
enlarged class of efficient, symmetric, and linear values, of which the Shapley value is the
most important representative. For this enlarged class of values, explicit relationships to the
Shapley value are exploited in order to present a uniform approach to obtain axiomatizations
of such values with reference to a slightly adapted inessential game property, continuity, and
a similar associated consistency. The uniqueness proofs in Hamiache’s axiomatization and
Driessen’s axiomatic characterization are rather tough and full of combinatorial calculations.
In cooperative game theory, linear transformations of games are widely used, for instance
the dual of a game. Another well-known example is that any cooperative game can be
represented as a linear combination of the unanimity games. On the other hand, there are
many linear values such as the Shapley value that can be represented as a linear combination
of all the worths v(S), S ⊆ N . So algebraic representations and matrix analysis should be a
justifiable technique in cooperative game theory. This motivates our present work.
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In this paper, the matrix approach is adopted to develop Hamiache’s axiomatization of
Shapley value and Driessen’s extended work. In Section 2, we introduce the notion of row
(resp. column)-coalitional matrix in the framework of cooperative game theory. Particularly,
both the Shapley value and the associated game are represented algebraically by their coali-
tional matrices called the Shapley standard matrix MSh and the associated transformation
matrix Mλ, respectively. The diagonalization procedure of Mλ and the inessential property
for coalitional matrices are fundamental tools to prove the convergence of the sequence of
repeated associated games as well as its limit game to be inessential. In Section 3, the associ-
ated consistency for the Shapley value is formulated as the matrix equalityMSh =MSh ·Mλ.
We achieve a matrix approach for Hamiache’s axiomatization of the Shapley value. In Sec-
tion 4, a similar matrix approach is applicable to study Driessen’s axiomatization of a certain
class of linear values. To conclude with, matrix analysis is a new and powerful technique for
research in the field of cooperative game theory.
2 The Shapley standard matrix and the associated transfor-
mation matrix
Firstly, let us define a new type of matrix to apply matrix theory to cooperative game theory.
Definition 1. A matrix M is called a row (resp. column)-coalitional matrix if its rows (resp.
columns) are indexed by coalitions S ⊆ N in the traditional order (one-person coalitions are
at the top, etc.). And a row-coalitional matrix M = [−→mS ]S⊆N,S 6=∅ is row-inessential if the
row-vector of M indexed by coalition S verifies −→mS =
∑
i∈S
−→mi for all S ⊆ N .
Without going into details, we recall the well-known Shapley value Sh(N, v) as follows:
Shi(N, v) =
∑
S⊆N,S3i
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
[
v(S)− v(S \ {i})
]
for all i ∈ N.
Because of its linearity property, the Shapley value can be represented by the Shapley standard
matrix as follows.
Definition 2. Given any game 〈N, v〉, the Shapley value Sh(N, v) can be represented by the
Shapley standard matrix MSh as:
Sh(N, v) =MShv,
where the matrix MSh =
[
MSh
]
i∈N,S⊆N,S 6=∅ is column-coalitional defined by
[
MSh
]
i,S
=

(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
, if i ∈ S;
−s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
, if i /∈ S.
Now let us recite the definition of the associated game in [3]. Given any game 〈N, v〉 and
λ ∈ R, define its associated game 〈N, vShλ 〉 as follows:
vShλ (S) := v(S) + λ
∑
j∈N\S
[
v(S ∪ {j})− v(S)− v({j})
]
for all S ⊆ N
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Notice that vShλ (∅) = 0 and moreover, vShλ = v for all inessential games 〈N, v〉. We do not
care about the trivial case λ = 0. The worth vShλ (S) of coalition S in the associated game
differs from the initial worth v(S) by taking into account the possible (weighted) net benefits
v(S ∪ {j})− v(S)− v({j}) arising from mutual cooperation among the coalition S itself and
any of each isolated non-members j ∈ N \ S. Obviously, the worth vShλ (S) of coalition S can
be expressed as
vShλ (S) =
[
1− (n− s)λ]v(S) + λ ∑
j∈N\S
v(S ∪ {j})− λ
∑
j∈N\S
v({j}).
In order to apply matrix theory, we introduce the associated transformation matrix to repre-
sent the associated game and the sequence of repeated associated games as follows.
Definition 3. Given any game 〈N, v〉 and λ ∈ R, the associated game 〈N, vShλ 〉 can be
represented by the associated transformation matrix Mλ as:
vShλ =Mλ · v,
where the matrix Mλ =
[
Mλ
]
S,T⊆N
S,T 6=∅
is both row-coalitional and column-coalitional defined by
[
Mλ
]
S,T
=

1− (n− s)λ, if T = S;
λ, if T = S ∪ {j} and j ∈ N \ S;
−λ, if T = {j} and j ∈ N \ S;
0, otherwise.
And its sequence of repeated associated games {〈N, vm∗Shλ 〉}∞m=0 is defined as:
vm∗Shλ =Mλ · v(m−1)∗Shλ for all m ≥ 1, where v0∗Shλ = v.
Now the main goal is to investigate eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the associated trans-
formation matrix Mλ. Let I be the identity matrix.
Proposition 2.1. 1 is an eigenvalue of Mλ, and eigenvectors corresponding to eigenvalue 1
are row-inessential.
Proof. Since vShλ (N) = v(N), the last row of matrix I −Mλ is the zero-vector. So 1 is
an eigenvalue of Mλ. Let ~x = (xS)S⊆N,S 6=∅ be an eigenvector corresponding to eigenvalue 1.
Interpret ~x as a row-coalitional matrix. Since (I −Mλ)~x = ~0, we have
(n− s)xS −
∑
j∈N\S
xS∪{j} +
∑
j∈N\S
xj = 0 for all S ⊆ N,S 6= ∅.
By this equation, for any N \ S = {i}, we have xN\{i} + xi = xN . Then if N \ S = {i, j}, it
should be
2xN\{i,j} + xi + xj = xN\{i} + xN\{j} = xN − xi + xN − xj .
Thus
xN\{i,j} + xi + xj = xN for all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j.
So, we obtain
xS +
∑
j∈N\S
xj = xN for all S ⊆ N,S 6= ∅.
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Applying the latter equality to one-person coalitions, it holds xN =
∑
j∈N
xj . So we conclude
xS =
∑
j∈S
xj for all S ⊆ N,S 6= ∅.
From the inessential property of any eigenvector ~x corresponding to eigenvalue 1, it follows
immediately that the dimension of the eigenspace of eigenvalue 1 is equal to n.
Proposition 2.2. For every k (2 ≤ k ≤ n), we have rank[(1 − kλ)I −Mλ] ≤ 2n − 1 −
(
n
k
)
,
and hence 1− kλ is an eigenvalue of Mλ.
Proof. For any k (2 ≤ k ≤ n), let vector ~x = (xS)S⊆N,S 6=∅ be such that [(1−kλ)I−Mλ]~x = ~0.
Then the following system of linear equations holds,
(n− s− k)xS −
∑
j∈N\S
xS∪{j} +
∑
j∈N\S
xj = 0 for all S ⊆ N,S 6= ∅. (1)
For the case of S = N , since k · xN = 0 and k 6= 0, we have xN = 0. In the sequel, we show
that for any k, there are
(
n
k
)
identical equations in the linear system of [(1−kλ)I−Mλ]~x = ~0.
If s = n− 1 and S = N \ {j}, by (1) we have
(1− k)xN\{j} − xN + xj = 0.
That is
xN\{j} =
1
k − 1xj for all j ∈ N. (2)
Considering s = n− 2 and S = N \ {i, j}, by (1) and (2), we conclude
(2− k)xN\{i,j} − xN\{i} − xN\{j} + xi + xj = 0
(2− k)xN\{i,j} =
2− k
k − 1(xi + xj).
If k = 2, these linear equations are identical equations for all coalitions S with s = n − 2,
total
(
n
2
)
equations in [(1− kλ)I −Mλ]~x = ~0. Otherwise, it should be
xN\{i,j} =
1
k − 1(xi + xj). (3)
In view of (2) and (3), for a given k, we use induction on n− s to show that
xS =
1
k − 1
∑
j∈N\S
xj for all S ⊆ N,S 6= N,S 6= ∅. (4)
Now suppose (4) is true for all n − s ≤ t − 1, where t ≤ k. For the case of n − s = t, let
S = N \ T . By (1), we have
(t− k)xN\T −
∑
i∈T
x(N\T )∪{i} = −
∑
j∈T
xj .
By the inductive assumption and i ∈ T , we obtain
x(N\T )∪{i} =
1
k − 1
(∑
j∈T
xj − xi
)
.
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Thus
(t− k)xN\T −
t
k − 1
∑
j∈T
xj +
1
k − 1
∑
i∈T
xi = −
∑
j∈T
xj .
(t− k)xN\T =
t− k
k − 1
∑
j∈T
xj . (5)
So if t 6= k, then (5) implies that (4) holds for s = n− t.
Furthermore, by (5), if t = k, then
(
n
k
)
linear equations in [(1 − kλ)I −Mλ]~x = ~0 are
identical equations. Hence, rank[(1− kλ)I −Mλ] ≤ 2n − 1−
(
n
k
)
. Consequently, 1− kλ is an
eigenvalue of Mλ for 2 ≤ k ≤ n.
Here we recall some results in algebraic theory for getting more properties of the associated
transformation matrix Mλ.
Lemma 2.3 (Algebraic results, cf. [4]). Let A be a square matrix of order p.
1. The dimension d of the solution space of the linear system of equations A~x = ~0 satisfies
d = p− rank(A).
2. For every eigenvalue of matrix A, its (algebraic) multiplicity is at least the dimension
of the corresponding eigenspace.
3. The sum of the multiplicities of all eigenvalues of matrix A equals the order p.
4. The matrix A is diagonalizable if and only if the sum of the dimensions of the distinct
eigenspaces equals p, and this happens if and only if the dimension of the eigenspace for
each eigenvalue equals the multiplicity of the eigenvalue.
Theorem 2.4. Eigenvalues of the associated transformation matrix Mλ are 1, 1 − kλ (k =
2, 3, · · · , n), and multiplicities corresponding to these eigenvalues are (n1), (nk) (k = 2, 3, · · · , n).
Proof. Let u1 = 1 and uk = 1 − kλ(k = 2, 3, · · · , n). By Proposition 2.1 and 2.2, we
know that uk (k = 1, 2, · · · , n) are eigenvalues of Mλ. Let dk denote the dimension of the
eigenspace corresponding to (ukI−Mλ)~x = ~0. By Proposition 2.1, we obtain d1 = n, whereas
from Proposition 2.2 and Lemma 2.3 (1), we derive
dk = 2n − 1− rank(ukI −Mλ) ≥
(
n
k
)
(k = 2, 3, · · · , n).
Since the multiplicity mk of eigenvalue uk satisfies mk ≥ dk, we have
2n − 1 =
n∑
k=1
mk ≥ n+
n∑
k=2
dk ≥
(
n
1
)
+
n∑
k=2
(
n
k
)
= 2n − 1.
Thus mk = dk =
(
n
k
)
for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n and so the matrix Mλ has no other eigenvalues.
From Theorem 2.4, we conclude that the matrix Mλ is diagonalizable. In order to prove
the next theorem, we make use of the following properties of row-coalitional matrices.
Lemma 2.5. Let M be a row-coalitional matrix and A be a matrix.
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1. If M is row-inessential, then the row-coalitional matrix MA is row-inessential.
2. If A is invertible, then MA is row-inessential if and only if M is row-inessential.
3. For every game 〈N, v〉 ∈ G, if M is row-inessential, then the new game 〈N,M · v〉 is
inessential.
Proof. Write M = [−→mS ]S⊆N,S 6=∅, where −→mS is the row vector of M indexed by a coalition S.
1. Since M is row-inessential, −→mS =
∑
i∈S
−→mi, so
−−−−→
[MA]S = −→mSA = (
∑
i∈S
−→mi)A =∑
i∈S(
−→miA) =
∑
i∈S(
−−−−→
[MA]i) for any S ⊆ N,S 6= ∅. Thus MA is row-inessential.
2. Following conclusion 1, if A is invertible, then −→mSA =
∑
i∈S(
−→miA) = (
∑
i∈S
−→mi)A if
and only if −→mS =
∑
i∈S
−→mi for any S ⊆ N . That is to say, M is row-inessential.
3. If M is row-inessential, then −→mS · v = (
∑
i∈S
−→mi) · v =
∑
i∈S(
−→mi · v) for every game
〈N, v〉 ∈ G. Thus, M · v = [−→mS · v]S⊆N is inessential.
Now we present the following important properties of the associated transformation matrix
Mλ by its diagonalization procedure and Proposition 2.1.
Lemma 2.6. Let Mλ be the associated transformation matrix.
1. Mλ = PDλP−1, where Dλ = diag(1, · · · , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(n1) times
, 1− 2λ, · · · , 1− 2λ,︸ ︷︷ ︸
(n2) times
· · · , 1− nλ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(nn) times
) and P
consists of eigenvectors of Mλ corresponding to eigenvalues 1, 1− kλ (2 ≤ k ≤ n).
2. If 0 < λ < 2n , then limm→∞(Mλ)
m = PDP−1, where D = diag(1, · · · , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
, 0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
2n−1−n times
).
3. The row-coalitional matrix PD equals PD = [
−→
x1,
−→
x2, · · · ,−→xn,~0, · · · ,~0] and PD is row-
inessential, where column vectors
−→
xi (i = 1, 2, · · ·n) are different eigenvectors of Mλ
corresponding to eigenvalue 1 and ~0 denotes a zero column vector.
Using the previous results, we derive the next theorem about the convergence of the
sequence of repeated associated games.
Theorem 2.7. Let 0 < λ < 2n . The sequence of repeated associated games {〈N, vm∗Shλ 〉}∞m=0
converges to the game 〈N, v˜〉 , where v˜ = PDP−1 · v. Furthermore, the limit game 〈N, v˜〉 is
inessential.
Proof. By the second conclusion of Lemma 2.6, lim
m→∞ v
m∗Sh
λ = limm→∞(Mλ)
m · v = PDP−1 · v.
Due to Lemma 2.5 (3) and v˜ = PDP−1 ·v, the game 〈N, v˜〉 is inessential whenever the matrix
PDP−1 is row-inessential. By Lemma 2.6 (3), the matrix PD is row-inessential. Together
with Lemma 2.5 (2) it follows that the matrix PDP−1 is row-inessential too. This completes
the proof.
Remark 1. Notice that the limit game 〈N, v˜〉 of the sequence of repeated associated games
merely depends on the game 〈N, v〉 as v˜ = PDP−1v. And for any player i ∈ N , the limit
worth v˜({i}) is just the inner product of the i−th row vector of PDP−1 and the column
vector v.
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3 Associated consistency and the Shapley value
In this section we apply the results from the previous section to develop a matrix approach
for Hamiache’s axiomatization of the Shapley value (see [3]). Firstly, we recall Hamiache’s
system of axioms:
1. (Associated Consistency). For every game 〈N, v〉 and its associated game 〈N, vShλ 〉, the
value verifies Φ(N, v) = Φ(N, vShλ ).
2. (Inessential Game Property). For every inessential game 〈N, v〉, the value verifies
Φi(N, v) = v({i}) for all i ∈ N .
3. (Continuity). For every convergent sequence of games {〈N, vk〉}∞k=0 the limit of which is
the game 〈N, v¯〉, the sequence of values satisfies convergence too, that is lim
k→∞
Φ(N, vk)
= Φ(N, v¯) (The convergence of the sequence of games is point-wise).
Here the associated consistency means that any player receives the same payments in the
original game and in the associated game. In matrix theory, as the following lemma cites, the
Shapley standard matrix MSh is invariant under multiplication with the associated transfor-
mation matrix Mλ.
Lemma 3.1. The Shapley value verifies the associated consistency, that is MSh =MShMλ.
Sketch of the Proof. Since Sh(N, v) =MShv and Sh(N, vShλ ) =M
Sh(Mλ ·v), it is sufficient
to check the matrix equality MShMλ =MSh, or equivalently, MSh(Mλ− I) = 0, for showing
that the Shapley value satisfies the associated consistency. By the definition of MSh, the
entry equality
[
MSh(Mλ − I)
]
i,T
= 0 for all i ∈ N and for all T ⊆ N , T 6= ∅, is as follows:
∑
S⊆N,i∈S
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
[
Mλ − I
]
S,T
−
∑
S⊆N,i/∈S
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
[
Mλ − I
]
S,T
= 0.
Its proof is listed in the appendix, as well as the algebraic interpretation for the associated
consistency.
Theorem 3.2 (cf. [3]). For 0 < λ < 2n , the Shapley value is the unique value verifying the
associated consistency, inessential game property, and continuity.
Proof by Matrix Approach. Obviously, the Shapley value satisfies the inessential game and
the continuity axioms, and by Lemma 3.1 the Shapley value verifies the associated consistency.
So, let us now turn to the unicity proof. Consider a value Φ satisfying these three axioms.
Fix the game 〈N, v〉. We show that Φ(N, v) = Sh(N, v). By both the associated consistency
and continuity for Φ, it holds
Φ(N, v) = Φ(N, v˜), where v˜ = PDP−1 · v.
Since the limit game 〈N, v˜〉 is shown to be inessential in Theorem 2.7, the inessential game
property for Φ yields Φi(N, v˜) = v˜({i}) for all i ∈ N . In summary, Φ(N, v) = (v˜({i}))i∈N .
Similarly, since the Shapley value also verifies these three axioms, it follows that
Sh(N, v) = Sh(N, v˜) = (v˜({i}))i∈N .
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From this, we conclude Φ(N, v) = Sh(N, v). This completes the proof.
Remark 2. Since Sh(N, v) = MShv and v˜ = PDP−1 · v, we deduce from Sh(N, v) =
(v˜({i}))i∈N that the Shapley standard matrix MSh is just the first part of the row-coalitional
matrix PDP−1 indexed by one-person coalitions. In fact, PDP−1 is the extension of MSh
by the row inessential property.
4 The B−associated transformation matrix and B−associated
consistency
In [2], Driessen extended Hamiache’s axiomatization to the enlarged class of efficient, sym-
metric, and linear values, of which the Shapley value is the most important representative.
The family of least square values ([7]) as well as the solidarity value ([5]) are members of
this class. For this enlarged class of values, explicit relationships to the Shapley value are
exploited in order to present a uniform approach to obtain axiomatizations of such values
with reference to a slightly adapted inessential game property, continuity, and a similar as-
sociated consistency. Following the former matrix analysis on Hamiache’s axiomatization of
the Shapley value, a similar algebraic approach is applicable to study Driessen’s work.
Throughout this section, denote by B = {bns
∣∣ n ∈ N \ {0, 1}, s = 1, 2, · · · , n} a collection
of positive scaling constants, whereas bnn := 1. Given any game 〈N, v〉 and λ ∈ R, Driessen
defined its B−associated game 〈N, vBλ 〉 in [2] as follows: vBλ (∅) = 0 and for all S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅,
vBλ (S) = v(S) + λ ·
∑
j∈N\S
[bns+1
bns
· v(S ∪ {j})− v(S)− b
n
1
bns
· v({j})
]
.
That is,
vBλ (S) = [1− (n− s)λ] · v(S) +
λ · bns+1
bns
∑
j∈N\S
v(S ∪ {j})− λ · b
n
1
bns
∑
j∈N\S
v({j}).
Analogical to the matrix approach for the associated game, we restate the B−associated game
as follows.
Definition 4. Given any game 〈N, v〉 and λ ∈ R, the B−associated game 〈N, vBλ 〉 of 〈N, v〉
can be represented by the B−associated transformation matrix MBλ as:
vBλ =M
B
λ · v,
where the matrix MBλ is both row-coalitional and column-coalitional defined by [M
B
λ ]S,T =
bnt
bns
[Mλ]S,T for all S, T ⊆ N and S, T 6= ∅.
And its sequence of repeated B−associated games {〈N, vm∗Bλ 〉}∞m=0 is defined as:
vm∗Bλ =M
B
λ · v(m−1)∗Bλ for all m ≥ 1, where v0∗Bλ = v.
We write Mλ instead of MBλ if it concerns the unit constants b
n
s = 1 for all 1 ≤ s ≤ n, and
then 〈N, vBλ 〉 is the associated game 〈N, vShλ 〉 of 〈N, v〉. Next we show that the B−associated
transformation matrix MBλ inherits certain properties from the associated transformation
matrix Mλ.
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Proposition 4.1. LetMλ andMBλ be the associated transformation matrix and B−associated
transformation matrix, respectively.
1. MBλ = B
−1MλB, where B = diag(bn|S|)S⊆N,S 6=∅.
2. MBλ and Mλ have the same eigenvalues and the same (algebraic) multiplicities of eigen-
values. And ~y is an eigenvector of MBλ if and only if B~y is an eigenvector of Mλ.
3. If 0 < λ < 2n , then limm→∞(M
B
λ )
m = B−1 lim
m→∞(Mλ)
mB = B−1PDP−1B.
Proof.
1. Since B = diag(bn|S|)S⊆N,S 6=∅ is diagonal and b
n
s are positive for all 1 ≤ s ≤ n, its inverse
matrix B−1 = diag( 1bn|S|
)S⊆N,S 6=∅ is also diagonal. For any coalition S and T , we have
[B−1MλB]S,T =
∑
R⊆N,R 6=∅
[B−1]S,R[MλB]R,T = [B−1]S,S [MλB]S,T
=
1
bns
∑
R⊆N,R 6=∅
[Mλ]S,R[B]R,T =
1
bns
[Mλ]S,T [B]T,T =
bnt
bns
[Mλ]S,T
= [MBλ ]S,T .
Thus, the similarity property MBλ = B
−1MλB holds.
2. From the similarity property of conclusion 1, it is known that MBλ and Mλ have the
same eigenvalues and the same multiplicities of eigenvalues. Let ~y be an eigenvector of
MBλ corresponding to eigenvalue µ. Then
MBλ ~y = µ~y ⇐⇒ (B−1MλB)~y = µ~y ⇐⇒ Mλ(B~y) = B(µ~y) = µ(B~y).
Clearly, µ is an eigenvalue of Mλ and B~y is an eigenvector corresponding to µ.
3. It is derived immediately from conclusion 1 and Lemma 2.6 (2).
For any game 〈N, v〉, Driessen ([2]) defined its B−scaled game 〈N,Bv〉 by (Bv)(∅) := 0
and (Bv)(S) := bns · v(S) for all S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅. In terms of the B−scaling diagonal matrix B
we can rewrite the B−scaled version of the game 〈N, v〉 as
Bv = B · v where B = diag(bn|S|)S⊆N,S 6=∅.
The explicit relationship between the Shapley value and any efficient, symmetric, and
linear value is listed in the following theorem and the algebraic formulation in the subsequent
corollary.
Theorem 4.2 (cf. [2]). A value ψ on the game space G verifies efficiency, symmetry, and
linearity if and only if there exists a collection of constants B such that, for every game
〈N, v〉 ∈ G, the value ψ(N, v) = Sh(N,Bv).
Corollary 4.3. A value ψ on the game space G verifies efficiency, symmetry, and linearity
if and only if there exists a B−scaling diagonal matrix B = diag(bn|S|)S⊆N,S 6=∅ such that, for
any game 〈N, v〉 ∈ G, the value ψ(N, v) =MShBv.
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A value Φ on the game space G is said to verify B−associated consistency with respect
to the B−associated game if Φ(N, vBλ ) = Φ(N, v) for all games 〈N, v〉, and all λ ∈ R. This
property generalizes the associated consistency with respect to the associated game.
According to the next theorem, the B−associated game is well chosen in order to guarantee
that the corresponding efficient, symmetric, and linear value ψ satisfies the B−associated
consistency.
Theorem 4.4 (cf. [2]). For a given collection of constants B, let ψ be the corresponding
efficient, symmetric, and linear value on G. Then ψ(N, vBλ ) = ψ(N, v) for all games 〈N, v〉,
and all λ ∈ R.
Proof by Matrix Approach. In view of Corollary 4.3, we show MShB · vBλ = MShB · v.
Since vBλ = M
B
λ · v, it is sufficient to check MShB ·MBλ = MShB. From Proposition 4.1 (1)
and Lemma 3.1 respectively, we derive
MShB ·MBλ =MShB · (B−1MλB) = (MShMλ)B =MShB.
This completes the proof.
Definition 5 (cf. [2]). A value Φ on the game space G possesses the B−inessential game
property with reference to a given collection of constants B if the value verifies Φi(N, v) =
bn1 · v({i}) for all B−inessential games 〈N, v〉, and for all i ∈ N . Here the game is called
B−inessential if its B−scaled game 〈N,Bv〉 is inessential.
Similar to the result in Theorem 2.7 about the convergence of the sequence of repeated
associated games, the next theorem states the convergence of the sequence of repeated
B−associated games.
Theorem 4.5. Let 0 < λ < 2n . The sequence of repeated B−associated games {〈N, vm∗Bλ 〉}∞m=0
converges to the game 〈N, v¯〉, where v¯ = B−1PDP−1B ·v. Furthermore, the limit game 〈N, v¯〉
is B−inessential.
Proof. By Proposition 4.1 (3), the sequence of games {〈N, vm∗Bλ 〉}∞m=0 converges to v¯ =
lim
m→∞(M
B
λ )
m · v = B−1PDP−1B · v. So, Bv¯ = B · v¯ = PDP−1B · v. By Lemma 2.6 (3), the
matrix PD is row-inessential, and it follows from Lemma 2.5 (2) that the matrix PDP−1B is
row-inessential too. Hence, by Lemma 2.5 (3), the game is 〈N,Bv¯〉 inessential, i.e. the limit
game 〈N, v¯〉 is B−inessential .
Remark 3. Notice that the limit game 〈N, v¯〉 of the sequence of repeated B−associated
games merely depends on the game 〈N, v〉 as v¯ = B−1PDP−1B ·v. And for any player i ∈ N ,
the worth bn1 · v¯({i}) of the B−scaled version of the limit game, is just the inner product of the
i−th row vector of PDP−1 and the column vector Bv of the B−scaled version of the initial
game.
So far, we have presented three properties of a value on G, which are the B−inessential
game property, continuity, and B−associated consistency. In the following we show that any
efficient, symmetric, and linear value verifies these three properties.
Lemma 4.6 (cf. [2]). For a given collection of constants B and any game 〈N, v〉, the
corresponding efficient, symmetric, and linear value ψ(N, v) = Sh(N,Bv) =MShB ·v verifies
the B−inessential game property, continuity, and B−associated consistency.
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Proof by Matrix Approach. By Theorem 4.4, the value ψ satisfies B−associated consis-
tency. If the B−scaled game 〈N,Bv〉 is inessential, then ψi(N, v) = Shi(N,Bv) = (Bv)({i}) =
bn1 · v({i}) for all i ∈ N . So, ψ verifies the B−inessential game property. Let us consider any
convergent sequence of games {〈N, vk〉}∞k=0, say the limit of which is the game 〈N, v〉. Since
the corresponding sequence of values {ψ(N, vk)}∞k=0 equals the sequence {MShB · vk}∞k=0,
which converges to MShB · v, that is the value ψ(N, v) of the limit game. This proves the
continuity of the value ψ.
Finally, we state Driessen’s axiomatization of efficient, symmetric, and linear values. And
we present an alternative proof based on the previous algebraic results.
Theorem 4.7 (cf. [2]). For a given collection of constants B, there exists a unique value
Φ on G verifying the B−inessential game property, continuity, and B−associated consistency
(0 < λ < 2n), and the value Φ is the efficient, symmetric, and linear value induced by B, i.e.
Φ(N, v) = Sh(N,Bv) for all games 〈N, v〉.
Proof by Matrix Approach. By Lemma 4.6, it is sufficient to concentrate on the unic-
ity proof. Consider a value Φ satisfying the B−inessential game property, continuity, and
B−associated consistency (0 < λ < 2n). Fix the game 〈N, v〉. We show that Φ(N, v) =
Sh(N,Bv). By both the B−associated consistency and continuity, it holds
Φ(N, v) = Φ(N, v¯), where v¯ = B−1PDP−1B · v.
Since the limit game 〈N, v¯〉 is shown to be B−inessential in Theorem 4.5, the B−inessential
game property for Φ yields Φi(N, v¯) = bn1 · v¯({i}) for all i ∈ N . In summary, Φ(N, v) =
bn1 · (v¯({i}))i∈N .
From the proof of Theorem 3.2, we have Sh(N, v) = Sh(N, v˜), i.e. MSh = MShPDP−1.
It follows that
MShB =MShPDP−1B =MShB ·B−1PDP−1B.
That is Sh(N,Bv) = Sh(N,Bv¯). Since the game 〈N,Bv¯〉 is inessential, we conclude that
Sh(N,Bv) = Sh(N,Bv¯) = bn1 · (v¯({i}))i∈N . Hence Φ(N, v) = Sh(N,Bv). That is, Φ(N, v)
agrees with the efficient, symmetric, and linear value induced by B.
5 Conclusions about matrix analysis
The paper deals with the class of efficient, symmetric, and linear values, of which the Shap-
ley value is the most important representative. Concerning the matrix approach for the
B−associated consistency of such values, especially the associated consistency of the Shap-
ley value, the next three tables summarize the relevant matrices, games and their mutual
relationships.
Matrix Name of matrix Value/Game Definition
MSh Shapley standard Sh(N, v) =MShv Definition 2
Mλ associated transformation vShλ =Mλ · v Definition 3
MBλ B−associated transformation vBλ =MBλ · v Definition 4
B B−scaling diagonal Bv = B · v Definition
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Sequence Limit Matrix Representation Property of Game Statement
{〈N, vm∗Shλ 〉}∞m=0 〈N, v˜〉 v˜ = PDP−1 · v inessential game Theorem 2.7
{〈N, vm∗Bλ 〉}∞m=0 〈N, v¯〉 v¯ = B−1PDP−1B · v B−inessential game Theorem 4.5
Property Hamiache Xu-Driessen-Sun Statement
similarity MBλ = B
−1MλB Proposition 4.1
associated consistency Sh(N, v) = Sh(N, vShλ ) M
Sh =MShMλ Lemma 3.1
B−ass. consistency MShB =MShBMBλ Theorem 4.4
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Appendix: Proof of Lemma 3.1.
Since Sh(N, v) =MShv and Sh(N, vShλ ) =M
Sh(Mλ · v), it suffices to check MSh =MShMλ
for showing that the Shapley value satisfies the associated consistency, i.e. MSh(Mλ−I) = 0.
By the definition of MSh and Mλ, for all i ∈ N and for all T ⊆ N , T 6= ∅, the entry[
MSh(Mλ − I)
]
i,T
is as follows:
[
MSh(Mλ−I)
]
i,T
=
∑
S⊆N,i∈S
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
[
Mλ−I
]
S,T
−
∑
S⊆N,i/∈S
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
[
Mλ−I
]
S,T
If i ∈ T and t ≥ 2,
=
(t− 1)!(n− t)!
n!
[
Mλ − I
]
T,T
+
∑
j∈T\{i}
(t− 2)!(n− t+ 1)!
n!
[
Mλ − I
]
T\{j},T
− (t− 1)!(n− t)!
n!
[
Mλ − I
]
T\{i},T
=
(t− 1)!(n− t)!
n!
[
− (n− t)λ
]
+
(t− 2)!(n− t+ 1)!
n!
(t− 1)λ− (t− 1)!(n− t)!
n!
λ
=
(t− 1)!(n− t)!
n!
[
− (n− t)λ+ (n− t+ 1)λ− λ
]
= 0
If i /∈ T and t ≥ 2,
= −
{ t!(n− t− 1)!
n!
[
Mλ − I
]
T,T
+
∑
j∈T
(t− 1)!(n− t)!
n!
[
Mλ − I
]
T\{j},T
}
= −
{ t!(n− t− 1)!
n!
[
− (n− t)λ
]
+
(t− 1)!(n− t)!
n!
tλ
}
= −
{ t!(n− t− 1)!
n!
[
− (n− t)λ+ (n− t)λ
]}
= 0
If T = {i},
=
(1− 1)!(n− 1)!
n!
[
Mλ − I
]
i,i
−
∑
S⊆N,i/∈S
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
[
Mλ − I
]
S,i
=
(1− 1)!(n− 1)!
n!
[
− (n− 1)λ
]
−
∑
1≤s≤n−1
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
(−λ)
(
n− 1
s
)
= −n− 1
n
λ+
∑
1≤s≤n−1
1
n
λ = 0
If T = {j} and j 6= i,
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=
∑
S⊆N\{j},i∈S
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
[
Mλ − I
]
S,j
−
{1!(n− 1− 1)!
n!
[
Mλ − I
]
j,j
+
∑
S⊆N\{i,j}
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
[
Mλ − I
]
S,j
}
=
∑
1≤s≤n−1
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
(−λ)
(
n− 2
s− 1
)
−
{1!(n− 1− 1)!
n!
[
− (n− 1)λ
]
+
∑
1≤s≤n−2
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
(−λ)
(
n− 2
s
)}
=
∑
1≤s≤n−1
(n− s)
n(n− 1)(−λ) +
(n− 1)!
n!
λ−
∑
1≤s≤n−2
n− s− 1
n(n− 1) (−λ) = 0
Four cases above imply that MSh =MShMλ. Thus the Shapley value satisfies the associated
consistency.
Remark 4. Notice that a coalitional matrix M verifies the associated consistency MSh =
MShM of the Shapley value, if and only if the column space ofM−I is a subspace of the null
space of the Shapley standard matrix MSh. Without proof, we emphasize that the column
space of Mλ − I equals the null space of MSh.
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